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LABOR AND EMPLOYMENT LAW
OVERVIEW
During the 1984-85 survey period, the Tenth Circuit resolved ap-
peals concerning several areas of labor and employment law. In em-
ployment law, the court considered employment-at-will arguments
based upon Colorado and New Mexico law.' In the traditional areas of
labor law, the Tenth Circuit upheld the findings and conclusions of the
National Labor Relations Board (NLRB or Board) and enforced the
Board's order in each labor case. When certain employers refused to
bargain with the certified employee representative, the court upheld the
Boards use of presumptions, hearing criteria, and discretion in the de-
termination of an appropriate bargaining unit. 2 The court applied the
current standard for determining the existence of representation elec-
tion misrepresentations, despite the Board's repeated changes of the
standard in recent years. When the court considered the issue of entitle-
ment to disability benefits while a strike is in progress, the court found
the benefits to be an accrued obligation of the company - unlike
wages.3 The court's decision emphasized labor law (employer retalia-
tion for union activity) rather than contract law. When faced with an
organization that acted like a local labor organization the court did not
hesitate to call it a local labor organization, subjecting it to the rigors of
the Labor-Management Reporting and Disclosure Act.4 The court fo-
cused on the purposes of the Act: to give union members a say in their
union's affairs and to ensure union democracy.
In each labor decision the court attempted to construe labor-man-
agement rights, conduct, and rules in light of the purposes of the rele-
vant statute. The Labor Management Relations Act is an enabling
statute, recognizing collective bargaining and employee representation
as in the public interest. Although the NLRB has wide discretion, the
Tenth Circuit has decided in favor of employee rights and collective bar-
gaining. The court does not seem willing to limit these objectives with-
out a clear mandate.
The Tenth Circuit's approach to labor issues was traditional and
straightforward. The court was unlikely to be swayed by arguments of
contractual waiver, conduct beyond the agency's scope of authority, or
artful statutory construction. The court's goal was to decide each case
in conformance with the objectives of national labor policy. Each court
should strive to do the same.
1. Garcia v. Aetna Finance Co., 752 F.2d 488 (10th Cir. 1984); Ellis v. El Paso Natu-
ral Gas Co., 754 F.2d 884 (10th Cir. 1985).
2. NLRB v. Foodland, 744 F.2d 735 (10th Cir. 1984); NLRB v. DPM of Kansas, Inc.,
744 F.2d 83 (10th Cir. 1984).
3. Conoco, Inc. v. NLRB, 740 F.2d 8111 (10th Cir. 1984).
4. Donovan v. National Transient Div., 736 F.2d 618 (10th Cir. 1984), cert. denied,
105 S. Ct. 781 (1985).
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I. EMPLOYER'S REFUSAL TO BARGAIN
The Tenth Circuit decided two cases where employers refused to
bargain with recently certified unions. In both cases the court upheld
findings of the National Labor Relations Board, holding that the em-
ployers had committed unfair labor practices, that the representation
election results were valid and ordering the employers to bargain with
the unions.
A. Election Misconduct: NLRB v. DPM of Kansas, Inc.
In NLRB v. DPM of Kansas, Inc. ,5 the union lost an election to repre-
sent various DPM employees but filed objections to the election. The
union alleged that DPM had interfered with the election by instituting a
job attendance bonus just prior to the election, and by adjusting an em-
ployee's vacation time. After investigation, the Board adopted the re-
gional director's recommendation that the election results be set aside
and a new election be held. The union won the second election, but the
employer objected, citing alleged union misrepresentations at the time
of ballotting. The Board overruled the objections, and certified the
union.6 The company refused to bargain with the union, causing the
union to file an unfair labor practice (ULP) charge. The Board found
the employer in violation of sections 8(a)(1) and (5) of the National La-
bor Relations Act,7 and sought enforcement in the Tenth Circuit.
With respect to the initial action, the Tenth Circuit stated that when
an employer provides an economic benefit to its employees, as DPM
had, just before a representation election is held, such an action is "sus-
pect" as an intentional attempt to influence the election's outcome. 8
The United States Supreme Court has termed well-timed benefits or in-
ducements offered by an employer prior to an election "the suggestion
of a fist inside the velvet glove." 9 Noting that the instant dispute con-
cerned the Board's inferences and legal conclusions drawn from DPM's
election time bonuses, rather than a factual dispute over what actually
occurred, the Tenth Circuit found no abuse of discretion by the Board,
and upheld its ruling.' 0
5. 744 F.2d 83 (10th Cir. 1984).
6. Id. at 85.
7. 29 U.S.C. §§ 158(a)(1), (a)(5) (1982).
8. 744 F.2d at 85.
9. NLRB v. Exchange Parts Co., 375 U.S. 405,409 (1964) ("Employees are not likel'
to miss the inference that the source of benefits now conferred is also the source from
which future benefits must flow and which may dry up if it is not obliged.").
10. 744 F.2d at 85. For similar Tenth Circuit holdings, see Crown Cork & Seal Co.,
Inc. v. NLRB, 659 F.2d 127, 130 (10th Cir. 1981) (The union made pre-election promises
of benefits should it be elected, which the court refused to analogize to similar employer
conduct - for if the union is defeated the union will be unable to retaliate. "When an
employer promises to improve working conditions if [its] employees reject an organizing
union, the employees' freedom of choice in the election is interfered with and the election
will be set aside."), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1150 (1982); NLRB v. Montgomery Ward & Co.,
554 F.2d 996, 1000-01 (10th Cir. 1977) (pre-planned wage increases announced after
union organizational effort underway violates section 8(a)(1)): NLRB v. Tonkawa Ref. Co..
434 F.2d 1041 (10th Cir. 1970) (the employer violated section 8(a)(l) "'by announcing and
[Vol. 63:2
LABOR AND EMPLOYMENT LA W
DPM's objections to the second election regarding alleged union
pre-election misrepresentations of fact involved an unclear area of the
law in which the Board has vacillated between differing standards for
election conduct. During implementation of the Wagner ActII and the
early years of the Taft-Hartley amendments, the NLRB did not attempt
to regulate campaign propaganda. The NLRB concentrated its efforts
on coercive conduct, believing that employee-voters would recognize
propaganda for what it was, and discount it.1 2 Gradually, the Board de-
veloped the position that elections should be held as close to "labora-
tory conditions" as possible. 13 Later, the Board set aside elections on a
case-by-case basis, such as when employees were deceived 14 or when
there was a severe impairment of free and informed choice.
15
In 1962, the election standard governing the truth or falsity of cam-
paign propaganda was refined in Hollywood Ceramics Co. ,16 No longer did
a party need to show an intent to mislead. Instead, the alleged misrep-
resentation need only have been a "substantial departure from the
truth" preventing other parties from "making an effective reply," which
could "reasonably be expected to have a significant impact on the
election." 1
7
The Board reversed this position in 1977, in Shopping Karl Food Mar-
granting wage increases in order to induce employees to reject the designation of a union
as a bargaining agent in a pending representation election."); J.C. Penney Co. v. NLRB,
384 F.2d 479, 484-85 (10th Cir. 1967) (pre-election promise of wage increases if employ-
ees withdrew from union); American Sanitary Prods. Co. v. NLRB, 382 F.2d 53, 57-58
(10th Cir. 1967) (the employer changed pay periods, instituted an incentive pay program
for efficient performance, and granted a paid holiday on employees' birthdays); Betts Bak-
ing Co. v. NLRB, 380 F.2d 199, 203 (10th Cir. 1967) (employer granted a wage increase
and retirement benefits following the start of a union drive), modified on other grounds, 428
F.2d 156 (10th Cir. 1970); NLRB v. Albuquerque Phoenix Express, 368 F.2d 451, 454
(10th Cir. 1966) (employer unilaterally granted wage increases during a union organiza-
tional effort); Crown Tar and Chem. Works, Inc. v. NLRB, 365 F.2d 588, 589-90 (10th Cir.
1966) (Pre-planned pay raises were announced at the same time the union drive was un-
derway. "The granting of economic benefits by the unilateral action of an employer while
union organizational efforts are underway, or while a representation election is pending, is
a violation of Sections 8(a)(l) and 8(a)(5) of the Act . . . .It follows that the employer
must bargain with the union."); NLRB v. Brown-Dunkin Co., 287 F.2d 17, 18-19 (10th Cir.
1961) (promise of pay raises and other benefits if unit employees rejected the union).
11. National Labor Relations Act of 1935, Pub. L. No. 74-198, 49 Stat. 449 (codified
as amended at 29 U.S.C. §§ 151-169 (1982)).
12. See also Midland Nat'l Life Ins. Co., 263 N.L.R.B. 127 (1982); N.P. Nelson Iron
Works, Inc., 78 N.L.R.B. 1270, 1271 (1948); Carrollton Furniture Mfg. Co., 75 N.L.R.B.
710, 712 (1948); Corn Products Ref. Co., 58 N.L.R.B. 1441, 1442 (1944).
13. General Shoe Corp., 77 N.L.R.B. 124, 127 (1948).
14. See, e.g., United Aircraft Corp., 103 N.L.R.B. 102, 103-05 (One union, in a run-off
representation election, distributed a "telegram" accusing the other union of "smearing"
its reputation. "This conduct lowered the standards of campaigning to a level which im-
paired the free and informed atmosphere requisite to an untrammeled expression of
choice by the employees.").
15. The Gummed Products Co., 112 N.L.R.B. 1092, 1094 (1955) (The employer dis-
tributed a handbill to employees asking them to compare their wages to other companies'
wages, but misquoted wage rates. "Petitioner's conduct exceeded the limits of legitimate
propaganda and lowered the standards of campaigning to a level which impaired the free
and untrammeled expression of choice by the employees herein.").
16. 140 N.L.R.B. 221 (1962).
17. Id. at 224.
1986]
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ket, Inc. 18 Based on the Board's experience of fifteen years under the
Hollywood Ceramics rule, and relying on the sophistication of voters, the
Board refused to consider the truth or falsity of campaign propaganda.
The Board said it would intervene only if there were "deceptive cam-
paign practices . . . involving the Board or its processes, or the use of
forged documents which render the voters unable to recognize the
propaganda for what it is."' 9
Twenty months after Shopping Kart, the Board returned to the
Hollywood Ceramics rule in General Knit of California, Inc.20 In order to
carry out its responsibility of ensuring fair and free union elections, the
Board believed that it should intervene where misrepresentations might
have a material effect on the election outcome.
2 1
Finally, four years later, the Board again reversed itself in Midland
National Life Insurance Co. ,22 and returned to the Shopping Kart standard.
The Board cited the need for speedy, final and uniform election results
as well as the need to minimize dilatory objections to elections. 23 It be-
lieved that the Hollywood Ceramics rule confused parties, provoked need-
less litigation, 24 and eluded consistent and equitable adjudications. 2 5
After weighing the interests involved, the Board stated its belief that
voters are able to recognize propaganda, and found that the protection-
ist Hollywood Ceramics rule was no longer warranted. 2 6 The new Midland
rule was to be applied in future as well as pending cases.
27
18. 228 N.L.R.B. 1311 (1977).
19. Id. at 1313.
20. 239 N.L.R.B. 619 (1978).
21. Id. at 620.
22. 263 N.L.R.B. 127 (1982).
23. Id. at 131.
24. Id. (quoting Bok, The Regulation of Campaign Tactics in Representation Elections under
the National Labor Relations Act, 78 HARV. L. REv. 38, 85 (1964)).
25. 263 N.L.R.B. at 132.
26. Id.
[The Shopping Kart rule] is a clear, realistic rule of easy application which lends
itself to definite, predictable election results. It removes impediments to free
speech by permitting parties to speak without fear that inadvertent errors will
provide the basis for endless delay or overturned elections, and promotes uni-
formity in national labor law by minimizing the basis for disagreement between
the Board and the courts of appeals.
Id. Noting its frequent changes in election standards, the Board stated: "[A]dministrative
flexibility is . . . one of the principal reasons for the establishment of the regulatory agen-
cies [because it] permits valuable experimentation and allows administrative policies to
reflect changing policy views." Id. at 132 (citing Leedom v. International Bhd. of Elec.
Workers, Local 108, 278 F.2d 237, 243 (D.C. Cir. 1960)). Further, the Board perceives its
function as involving statutory responsibilities and actions based on its "cumulative expe-
rience" of trial and error. It repeatedly emphasized that, regarding election misrepresen-
tations, reasonable minds can differ. Id. at 130, 132.
Board Members Jenkins and Fanning dissented. They criticized the Board for its
many reversals, and denounced the abandonment of the flexible and balanced Hollywood
Ceramics rule in favor of"an ultra-permissive standard that place[s] a premium on the well-
timed use of deception, trickery, and fraud." Id. at 133. They further castigated the
Board's emphasis on speed and a decreased workload, saying that the Board was "aban-
doning one of the most effective means. . . yet devised for assuring" a fair and free choice
of bargaining representative. Id. at 134-35.
27. 263 N.L.R.B. at 133 n.24.
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The Tenth Circuit had no difficulty in applying the Midland rule to
DPM, finding no abuse of discretion.2 8 The court noted that most other
circuits have also applied Midland to pending cases.
2 9
DPM's last objection was that it should have been granted an evi-
dentiary hearing on its election objections, rather than simply an admin-
istrative investigation and decision by the regional director.30 The
Tenth Circuit stated that in order to be granted an evidentiary hearing
concerning representation elections, the objecting party must make out
a prima facie case with evidence showing substantial and material factual
disputes which would merit setting the election aside if resolved in the
objector's favor.3 ' DPM did not make out such a prima facie case. This
requirement is consistent with prior Tenth Circuit decisions, 3 2 as well as
holdings by other circuits. 3 3 A hearing on representation objections is
not a procedure mandated by statute, but instead was created by the
Board. 3 4 The NLRB regional director is given discretion regarding
whether to grant a hearing,3 5 and in a consent election the Board also
has discretion to direct that a hearing be held.
3 6
B. Appropriate Bargaining Units: NLRB v. Foodland, Inc.
The companion refusal-to-bargain case decided by the Tenth Cir-
cuit was NLRB v. Foodland, Inc.3 7 Foodland operated six retail grocery
stores in northeastern Oklahoma. The United Food and Commercial
Workers Retail Clerks union filed a representation petition with the
Board seeking to represent all employees at Foodland's Owasso store,
except the meat department employees. The United Food and Com-
mercial Workers Meatcutters union filed a petition to represent the meat
department employees of the Owasso store. Foodland argued that the
28. 744 F.2d at 86.
29. Id. at 86 n.2 (citing NLRB v. Milwaukee Brush Mfg. Co., 705 F.2d 257 (7th Cir.
1983)).
30. 744 F.2d at 85.
31. Id at 85-86.
32. See, e.g., Crown Cork & Seal Co., Inc. v. NLRB, 659 F.2d at 129 (citing NLRB v.
Whitney Museum of Am. Art, 636 F.2d 19, 23 (2d Cir. 1980)); NLRB v. Gold Spot Dairy,
Inc., 432 F.2d 125, 128 (10th Cir. 1970)).
33. See, e.g., NLRB v. Newly Weds Foods, Inc., 758 F.2d 4, 12 (1st Cir. 1985); L.C.
Cassidy & Son, Inc. v. NLRB, 745 F.2d 1059, 1064 (7th Cir. 1984); NLRB v. ARA Serv.,
Inc., 717 F.2d 57, 63-64 (3d Cir. 1983); Certainteed Corp. v. NLRB, 714 F.2d 1042, 1047-
48 (11th Cir. 1983); NLRB v. Yellow Transp. Co., 709 F.2d 1342, 1343 (9th Cir. 1983);
EDS-IDAB, Inc. v. NLRB, 666 F.2d 917, 974 (5th Cir. 1982); NLRB v. Pinkerton's, Inc.,
621 F.2d 1322, 1325 (6th Cir. 1980); NLRB v. Cambridge Wire Cloth Co., Inc., 622 F.2d
1195, 1199 (4th Cir. 1980).
34. "In issuing a report on objections or challenged ballots, or both.., the regional
director may act on the basis of an administrative investigation or upon the record of a
hearing before a hearing officer." 29 C.F.R. § 102.69(d) (1985) (emphasis added).
35. Id.
36. "In a case involving a consent election . if exceptions are filed . . . and it
appears to the Board that such exceptions . . . raise issues, the Board may direct the re-
gional director . . . to issue . . . a notice of hearing on said exceptions before a hearing
officer." 29 C.F.R. § 102.69(f) (1985) (emphasis added).
37. 744 F.2d 735 (10th Cir. 1984).
1986]
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only appropriate bargaining unit would include all of its employees at all
six stores.
The Board's regional director found that the single store units for
both meat department employees and all other employees to be the ap-
propriate bargaining unit. The Board declined to review the regional
director's decision. Both unions won their respective elections, but
Foodland objected on the basis of union electioneering (election inter-
ference). The objection was overruled by the regional director, and the
Board did not review the decision. The unions were certified, but Food-
land refused to bargain with them. At the unfair labor practice (ULP)
hearing concerning the refusal to bargain, Foodland had no new evi-
dence to present so the administrative law judge refused to relitigate
Foodland's representation objections, a decision which the Board up-
held. 38 The Tenth Circuit, Judge McWilliams writing, enforced the
Board's order that Foodland must bargain with the unions.
Section 9(b) of the Labor Management Relations Act 39 (LMRA)
confers wide discretion on the NLRB in deciding the appropriate unit of
employees for collective bargaining purposes.40 This discretion can be
delegated to regional directors, and the unit need only be an appropri-
ate unit, rather than the most appropriate unit. 4 1 Even if division-wide
collective bargaining is desirable for the employer, the Board is empow-
ered to decide that a lesser unit is appropriate. 42 Further, the NLRB
may rely on presumptions it draws from its past experience in determin-
ing that a particular unit is appropriate.
4 3
One of the presumptions utilized in the Foodland case was that a
single store is an appropriate bargaining unit.4 4 The court found that
38. Id. at 739.
39. Section 9(b) of the Labor Management Relations Act (LMRA) states:
The Board shall decide in each case whether, in order to assure to employees the
fullest freedom in exercising the rights guaranteed by this subchapter, the unit
appropriate for the purposes of collective bargaining shall be the employer unit,
craft unit, or subdivision thereof ....
29 U.S.C. § 159(b) (1982).
40. See, e.g., Friendly Ice Cream Corp. v. NLRB, 705 F.2d 570, 574 (1st Cir. 1983);
Presbyterian/St. Luke's Medical Center v. NLRB, 653 F.2d 450, 454 (10th Cir. 1981);
NLRB v. Gold Spot Dairy, Inc., 432 F.2d 125, 127 (10th Cir. 1970); Presbyterian/St.
Luke's Medical Center v. NLRB, 653 F.2d 127 (10th Cir. 1970); NLRB v. Groendyke
Transp., 372 F.2d 137, 140 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 387 U.S. 932 (1967); NLRB v. Dewey
Portland Cement Co., 336 F.2d 117, 119 (10th Cir. 1964); Mountain States Tel. & Tel. Co.
v. NLRB, 310 F.2d 478, 479-80 (10th Cir. 1962). These decisions are consistent with
Packard Motor Car Co. v. NLRB, 330 U.S. 485, 491 (1947) ("Section 9(b) of the Act con-
fers upon the Board a broad discretion to determine appropriate units . . . [slo we have
power only to determine whether there is substantial evidence to support the Board."); see
also NLRB v. Hudson Oxygen Therapy Sales Co., 764 F.2d 729, 733 (9th Cir. 1985).
41. See, e.g., Beth Israel Hosp. & Geriatric Center v. NLRB, 688 F.2d 697, 699-700
(10th Cir. 1982).
42. See, e.g., NLRB v. Pan Am. Petroleum Corp, 444 F.2d 328, 331 (10th Cir. 1971);
NLRB v. Groendyke Transp., Inc., 417 F.2d 33, 35 (10th Cir. 1969).
43. Beth Israel Hospital, 688 F.2d at 699-700. Presumptions may be used in all indus-
tries, excluding health care. The court found that other circuits either approve of the
NLRB's use of presumptions, or at least do not disapprove.
44. Foodland, 744 F.2d at 737. In Haag Drug Co.. Inc., 169 N.L.R.B. 877 (1968), the
Board reiterated a policy it announced in Say-On Drugs, Inc., 138 N.L.R.B. 103.2 (1962),
400 [Vol. 63:2
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the Owasso store manager had a significant amount of supervisory au-
thority, that there was a minimum of employee interchange between
Foodland stores, there was no multi-store bargaining history, and that
the union did not want to represent a larger bargaining unit. These fac-
tors, in addition to the Board's single-store presumption, provided sub-
stantial evidence justifying the Board's decision.
4 5
The second presumption involved was that meat department em-
ployees are an appropriate bargaining unit. 4 6 This presumption has
been established by the Board and accepted by the courts.4 7 The Tenth
Circuit rejected an attempt to apply the Board's decision in Great Day,
Inc.,4 8 where the Board stated that there were countervailing factors
overcoming the meat department unit presumption. In Great Day, few
employees had any training, much of the beef was already pre-cut and
refusing to find that the appropriate unit "embraces all the employees within an em-
ployer's administrative or geographic area." The Board stated: "Our experience has led
us to conclude that a single store in a retail chain, like single locations in multilocation
enterprises in other industries, is presumptively an appropriate unit for bargaining." Haag
Drug, 169 N.L.R.B. at 877. The Board went on to state:
Absent a bargaining history in a more comprehensive unit or functional integra-
tion of a sufficient degree to obliterate separate identity, the employees' "fullest
freedom" is maximized . . . by treating the employees in a single store or restau-
rant of a retail chain operation as normally constituting an appropriate unit for
collective bargaining purposes. The employees .. .form a homogeneous, iden-
tifiable, and distinct group, physically separated from the employees in the other
outlets of the chain; they generally perform related functions under immediate
supervision apart from employees at other locations; and their work functions,
though parallel to, are nonetheless separate from the functions of employees in
the other outlets, and thus their problems and grievances are peculiarly their own
and not necessarily shared with employees in the other outlets.
Id. at 877-78.
The presumption may be rebutted by facts showing a stable multi-store bargaining rela-
tionship, centralization of management, extensive employee interchange, and close geo-
graphic proximity of the stores. Id. at 878-89. However, the paramount factor in
determining an appropriate unit is assurance that the employees are able to exercise free-
dom of choice. "While an employer's interest in bargaining with the most convenient
possible unit should be accommodated when feasible, the Board is free to grant greater
weight to the employees' interest in being represented by a representative of their own
choosing." Friendly Ice Cream, 705 F.2d at 575. See also Pacific Southwest Airlines v. NLRB,
587 F.2d 1032, 1043-44 (9th Cir. 1978); NLRB v. Western and Southern Life Ins. Co., 391
F.2d 119, 123 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 978 (1968). The single store has been found
to be an inappropriate unit in a number of cases. See, e.g., Kirlin's Inc., 227 N.L.R.B. 1220,
1221 (1977) (store manager's lack of autonomy); Gray Drug Stores, Inc., 197 N.L.R.B.
924, 926 (1972) (community of interest of employees in stores in certain geographic prox-
imity); Twenty-First Century Restaurant of Nostrand Avenue Corp., 192 N.L.R.B. 881,
882 (1971) (close proximity of locations); Waiakamilo Corp., 192 N.L.R.B. 878 (1971)
(common working conditions and lack of autonomy of single stores).
45. 744 F.2d at 738.
46. Id.
47. See Daylight Grocery Co., Inc. v. NLRB, 678 F.2d 905, 907 (11th Cir. 1982) (unit
excluding meat department employees); Big Y Foods, Inc. v. NLRB, 651 F.2d 40, 45 (1st
Cir. 1981); Amalgamated Meat Cutters, Local 576 v. NLRB, 663 F.2d 223, 225 (D.C. Cir.
1980) (employees represented by Meat Cutters and Retail Clerks, respectively); NLRB v.
Big Bear Supermarkets No. 3, 640 F.2d 924 (9th Cir.) (two unions representing employ-
ees, Meatcutters and Retail Clerks), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 919 (1980); NLRB v. Gerbes
Super Mkts., Inc., 436 F.2d 19, 22 (8th Cir. 1971); Schauffler v. Local 1357, Retail Clerks
Int'l Ass'n, 199 F. Supp. 357, 358 (E.D. Pa. 1961) (unit excluding the meat, seafood, and
delicatessen employees).
48. 248 N.L.R.B. 527 (1980).
1986]
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boxed, employees rotated among all departments, and seventy-five per-
cent of their work did not involve traditional meatcutting skills. 4 9 In
contrast, Foodland's Owasso store manager was relatively autonomous,
the meat department employees received specialized training and higher
wages, there was little employee interchange between the meat depart-
ment and other departments, and the meat department manager super-
vised only meat department employees. In addition, the meat
department employees spent most of their time performing tasks requir-
ing special meatcutting skills.
50
Foodland attempted to have the elections set aside, alleging imper-
missible union electioneering near the polls. 5' By pre-arrangement,
certain employees favoring union representation donned "Vote Yes"
buttons fifteen minutes before the polls opened. 52 In previous deci-
sions, the Tenth Circuit has approved the section 7 right of an employee
to wear union insignia while on the employer's premises during working
hours. 53 Likewise, the Tenth Circuit found Foodland's objections of im-
permissible electioneering to be de minimis, and upheld the regional
director's dismissal of the charge.
54
Union insignia is a form of protected expression under section 7.55
Standing alone, the displaying or wearing of union insignia by employ-
ees does not disrupt voting procedures, nor does it impair the exercise
of free choice. 56 The Board has refused to set aside elections where the
following activities took place: 1) employees wore "Vote No" paper hats
before the election;57 2) employees wore "Vote Yes" buttons and
"IUWA" T-shirts at the polling place; 58 and 3) employees displayed doc-
uments pinned on their backs entitled "My Reason for Voting No."'5 9
49. In Great Day, the Board found it "unnecessary to pass on the employer's conten-
tion that the merger of the retail Clerks International Union with the Amalgamated Meat
Cutters and Butcher Workmen supports its position for inclusion of the meat department
in a storewide unit." Id. at 528 n.6.
50. Foodland, 744 F.2d at 737.
51. Id,
52. Id. at 739.
53. NLRB v. Montgomery Ward & Co., Inc., 554 F.2d 996, 1000 (10th Cir. 1977)
(quoting Serv-Air, Inc. v. NLRB, 395 F.2d 557, 563 (10th Cir.)) (overturning the em-
ployer's no-solicitation ban which interfered with union organizing activities), cert. denied,
393 U.S. 840 (1968)). Section 7 of the LMRA states: "Employees shall have the right...
to engage in . . . concerted activities for the purpose of collective bargaining or other
mutual aid or protection, and shall also have the right to refrain from any or all such
activities." 29 U.S.C. § 157 (1982).
54. 744 F.2d at 739.
55. Montgomery Ward, 554 F.2d at 1000.
56. In Worley Mills, Inc. v. NLRB, 685 F.2d 362, 367 (10th Cir. 1982), the court
stated that the test to be applied to employee or third party electioneering is whether there
is an " 'atmosphere necessary to the free exercise of free choice.' " (quoting EDS-IDAB,
Inc., 666 F.2d at 975).
57. Mar-Jac Poultry Co., 123 N.L.R.B. 1571, 1573 (1959).
58. Sewanee Coal Operators Ass'n, Inc., 146 N.L.R.B. 1145, 1147 (1964); R.H. Os-
brin, Mfg. Co., 114 N.L.R.B. 940, 941-42 (1955), enforced, 218 F.2d 342 (9th Cir. 1954),
cert. denied, 349 U.S. 928 (1955).
59. Vegas Village Shopping Center Corp., 229 N.L.R.B. 279, 290 (1977) ("The Board
has consistently held that wearing stickers, buttons, and similar campaign insignia by par-
ticipants as well as observers at an election is, without more, not prejudicial.").
402 [Vol. 63:2
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The Ninth Circuit has stated that the Board has regulated only election-
eering while the polls are open,60 while allowing electioneering prior to
the election.
6 '
Foodland attempted to relitigate its election objections, and allega-
tions of unlawful union election interference, during the hearing on its
alleged unfair labor practice. The court held that the Board was not to
reconsider previously litigated representation issues in the ULP hearing
since new or previously unavailable evidence was not presented. 6 2 The
Tenth Circuit has previously dealt with this same issue, in line with
United States Supreme Court guidelines.
63
II. LABOR ORGANIZATIONS UNDER THE LMRDA: DONOVAN V.
NATIONAL TRANSIENT DIVISION
A. The Case
In Donovan v. National Transient Division,64 Secretary of Labor Dono-
van brought suit against the National Transient Division (NTD) of the
International Brotherhood of Boilermakers, seeking compliance with
the Labor-Management Reporting and Disclosure Act 65 (LMRDA) pro-
vision which requires labor organizations to hold periodic elections of
union officials.
66
NTD is one of five divisions of the International union, 6 7 but, unlike
the other divisions, it represents workers in 41 states and has no
subordinate local organizations. NTD represents 8,000 boilermaker
craftsmen who travel across the nation in crews, erecting steel tanks and
like structures. According to the International's constitution, NTD was
established to give status to and serve employees who engage in mobile
60. NLRB v. Hudson Oxygen Therapy Sales Co., 764 F.2d 729, 732-33 (9th Cir.
1985) (finding that electioneering during an election would be a greater threat to the "so-
ber reflection and calm deliberation" needed for free choice in a representation election
than would electioneering prior to any voting taking place).
61. Id.
62. 744 F.2d at 739.
63. In Magnesium Casting Co. v. NLRB, 401 U.S. 137, 141-42 (1971), the United
States Supreme Court held that: "Historically, the representation issue once fully litigated
in the representation proceeding could not be relitigated in an unfair labor practice pro-
ceeding." The Tenth Circuit applied this precedent in Beth Israel Hosp., 688 F.2d at 100-
01. It held that "unit selection remains a matter of agency discretion and expertise, unlike
factual questions that must be resolved at the unfair labor practice proceeding." Thus,
"the employer could challenge the unit selection only through judicial review in the circuit
court." Id. See also Gold Spot Dairy, Inc., 432 F.2d at 129 ('The objections to the two elec-
tions were adjudicated in the representation hearings and are not relitigable in the ab-
sence of newly discovered or previously unavailable evidence.").
Should an employer object to representation determinations and later be charged
with an unfair labor practice for refusing to bargain, then those representation challenges
are preserved. Id. at 702 (Barrett, J., dissenting). See also Leedom v. Kyne, 358 U.S. 184,
191 (1958); American Fed'n of Labor v. NLRB, 308 U.S. 401, 406 (1940); NLRB v. Ideal
Laundry and Dry Cleaning Co., 330 F.2d 712 (10th Cir. 1964).
64. 736 F.2d 618 (10th Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 105 S. Ct. 781 (1985).
65. 29 U.S.C. §§ 401-531 (1982).
66. 29 U.S.C. § 481 (1982).
67. The complete name of the international union is International Brotherhood of
Boilermakers, Iron Ship Builders, Blacksmiths, Forgers and Helpers, AFL-CIO.
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employment and cannot maintain membership or participate in a fixed-
location local.
The nine NTD officials were appointed by the International Presi-
dent, but there has never been an election of NTD officers. Several
NTD members complained to the International President and the Inter-
national Executive Council, and finally to the Secretary of Labor, that
NTD had failed to hold elections. The Secretary brought suit in federal
district court in 1979 to compel an election.
68
The district court, finding that it had jurisdiction,6 9 held that NTD
was a "labor organization" within the meaning of the LMRDA.70 The
court believed that the nationwide character of NTD proved that it was a
national, as opposed to a local, which meant that elections would be
required every five years under the LMRDA.7 1 The court ordered NTD
to comply with the provisions of the LMRDA, rejecting arguments that
such compliance would be difficult for, and have an adverse effect upon,
NTD.
7 2
The Tenth Circuit, in an opinion written by Judge Logan, affirmed
the district court, holding that NTD is a labor organization and subject
to coverage under the LMRDA. It also agreed that the lower court had
subject matter jurisdiction, and that the Secretary of Labor had the stat-
utory authority to investigate and sue to compel an election when none
had previously been held. However, the circuit court found NTD to be a
local labor organization, instead of a national labor organization, which
the Act requires to hold elections once every three years. 73 The court,
in establishing NTD as a local labor organization, emphasized NTD's
functions and purposes (which are similar to those performed by a typi-
cal local) over and above its geographical form (a union without locals
that transcends state boundaries). Finding congressional intent to focus
on the relationship between a labor organization and its members, the
court dismissed NTD's claims of inability and exceptions to
compliance.
74
B. History of the LMRDA
In the late 1950's, responding to media allegations of corrupt prac-
tices in the labor-management field, 7 5 Congress designated a special
committee to investigate racketeering and abuse in labor-management
68. 736 F.2d at 619. See Donovan v. National Transient Div., 542 F. Supp. 957, 958-
59 (D. Kan. 1982).
69. 542 F. Supp. at 959.
70. 29 U.S.C. §§ 402(i)-(j) (1982).
71. 29 U.S.C. § 481(b) (1982).
72. 542 F. Supp. at 960.
73. 29 U.S.C. § 408(b) (1982).
74. 736 F.2d at 622-23.
75. E.g.,R. KENNEDY, THE ENEMY WITHIN 7 (1960); Note, Clarification of Title IV of the
Labor-Management Reporting and Disclosure Act: Toward More Democratic Elections, 2 HOFSTRA
LAB. L.J. 157, 182 (1984).
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relations. 76 The well-publicized hearings uncovered "shocking condi-
tions."'7 7 The committee found that some union officers dictated the
management of union affairs. Trusteeships were unjustifiably pro-
longed or established over locals in order to prevent local democratic
power, to punish dissenters, to divert local funds, and to amass power
for union officials. 7 8 Many rank-and-file union members told the com-
mittee that they wanted corrected the abuses present in their labor orga-
nizations. 79 Irrational Cold War fears, as well as public response to
union corruption, spurred enactment of the LMRDA. 80 The Act was
meant to redistribute power from autocratic labor bosses to the rank-
and-file members. 8 1 This was because maintenance of free and demo-
cratic union elections was deemed to be in the public interest.
82
C. Powers of the Secretary
The LMRDA grants individual labor organizations the first oppor-
tunity to correct violations of the LMRDA,83 requiring members to ex-
haust all union remedies or to wait at least three months for union
corrective action before filing a complaint with the Secretary of Labor.
84
Once a complaint is filed, government intervention is mandatory and is
the exclusive remedy.8 5 The Secretary of Labor and the reviewing
courts have broad equitable powers to remedy LMRDA violations.
86
The Act orders the Secretary to investigate alleged LMRDA violations
based on a member's complaint, and to file suit if probable cause of a
violation is found.8 7 The Secretary's only explicit statutory remedies are
to "set aside the invalid election, if any, . . . and to direct the conduct of
76. DEPARTMENT OF LABOR, LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE LABOR-MANAGEMENT RE-
PORTING AND DISCLOSURE ACT OF 1959 1-25 (1959).
77. W. OBERER, K. HANSLOWE &J. ANDERSEN, LABOR LAw 172, 174 (1979).
78. DEPARTMENT OF LABOR, supra note 76, at 8.
79. U.S. SENATE SELECT COMM. ON IMPROPER ACTIVITIES IN THE LABOR-MANAGEMENT
FIELD, FINAL REPORT, S. REP. No. 187, 86th Cong., 1st Sess. 2328-38 (1959), reprinted in
1959 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 2322-2423 [hereinafter referred to as FINAL REPORT,
S. REP. No. 187].
80. J. RAYBACK, A HISTORY OF AMERICAN LABOR 437 (1966). The LMRDA is the first
law not protective of labor, and not concerned with the regulation of labor-management
relations. Id. at 436. "The passage of the act was appropriately symbolic of labor's fall
from grace." T. BROOKS, TOIL AND TROUBLE 228 (1980). The LMRDA is also "the first
substantial effort by the Federal Government to control internal union affairs." W.
OBERER, K. HANSLOWE &J. ANDERSEN, LABOR LAw 172 (1979).
81. 105 CONG. REC. 17,915 (1959).
82. See DEPARTMENT OF LABOR, supra note 76, at 24.
83. Wirtz v. Local 1622, United Bhd. of Carpenters, 285 F. Supp. 455, 462 (N.D. Cal.
1968); Goldberg v. Amalgamated Local 1355, 202 F. Supp. 844, 846 (E.D.N.Y. 1962).
84. 29 U.S.C. § 482(a) (1982); Hodgson v. Union de Empleados de los Supermercado
Pueblo, 388 F. Supp. 1026, 1028 (D.P.R. 1974).
85. Hodgson, 388 F. Supp. at 1028.
86. Id. at 1028-29 (upholding the Secretary's right to "the statutory remedy of a [La-
bor Department] supervised election" and disallowing an election supervised by a private
firm following a member's complaint to the Secretary). See, e.g., Brennan v. United Mine
Workers, 475 F.2d 1293, 1295-96 (D.C. Cir. 1973) (The court allowed the district court
"far-ranging relief to restore union democracy" such as an order to convene meetings and
adopt a democratic constitution. It further upheld "the court's broad equitable powers to
fashion a suitable remedy for the . . . atrophy of democratic principles and procedures.").
87. 29 U.S.C. §§ 482(a), (b) (1982).
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an election." 88
In order to guarantee free and democratic elections, it is necessary
to ensure that elections are initially held and to remedy abuses in sched-
uled elections. The wording of the LMRDA is directed at abuses in elec-
tions, and also reflects Congress' broad concern that elections might
never be held.89 Thus the Tenth Circuit's decision correctly read the
LMRDA as empowering the Secretary to sue to compel an election
where none has previously been held.
D. Definition of a Labor Organization
Subsections 3(i) and 3(j) of the LMRDA define a "labor organiza-
tion" for purposes of coverage under the Act.90 The definition is to be
broadly construed,9 1 and an organization can exist wholly or partially
for the statutory purposes of dealing with employers concerning griev-
ances, labor disputes, wage rates, hours, and other terms and conditions
of employment. 9 2 A particular organization's constitution and by laws
will be considered along with its actual functions and practices in deter-
mining whether the Act applies.93 The definition is meant to encompass
"any labor organization irrespective of size or formal attributes."'9 4 The
courts have consistently analyzed organizations by utilizing functional
criteria in order to determine whether they are included within the statu-
tory definition.
9 5
In National Transient Division, although NTD negotiated incomplete
collective bargaining agreements with employers, leaving wages and em-
88. National Transient Division, 736 F.2d at 620 (quoting 29 U.S.C. §§ 482(a), (b)
(1982) (emphasis added)). The court dismissed cases holding that the Secretary cannot
sue to postpone a scheduled election as inapposite. See Dunlop v. Bachowski, 421 U.S.
560, 568-70 (1975); Calhoon v. Harvey, 379 U.S. 134, 140 (1964).
89. 29 U.S.C. § 40 1(a) (1982) mandates that a national or international labor organi-
zation "shall elect its officers" at least once every five years, while section 481 (b) states that
a local labor organization "shall elect its officers" a minimum of once in three years (em-
phasis added). See generally Marshall v. Local 1374, Int'l Ass'n of Machinists, 558 F.2d
1354, 1358 (9th Cir. 1977) (statutory purposes include assurance of free and democratic
elections, and prompt resolution of election disputes); Goldberg v. Amalgamated Local
1355, 202 F. Supp. at 846 (the Act requires free, frequent, and periodic elections to ensure
that union officials are responsive to members' desires); Note, Union Elections and the
LMRDA; Thirteen Years of Use and Abuse, 81 YALE Lj. 407, 410-13 (1972) (the LMRDA
furthered the national labor policy of labor peace through industrial democracy).
90. 29 C.F.R. § 451.3(a)(2) (1985).
91. Id.
92. Id.
93. 29 C.F.R. § 451.3(a)(1) (1985). See also FINAL REPORT, S. REP. No. 187, supra note
79, at 2318, 2322-2323.
The definition [of labor organization] includes all forms and levels of labor or-
ganization and combinations of labor organizations which exist for or carry on
collective bargaining with employers, from internationals through locals ....
This definition. . . is intended to provide comprehensive coverage of labor orga-
nizations engaged in any degree in the representation of employees or adminis-
tration of collective bargaining agreements.
Id.
94. See, e.g., National Educ. Ass'n v. Marshall, 100 L.R.R.M. 2565 (D.D.C. 1979) (orga-
nizations dealt with employers regarding terms and conditions of employment).
95. National Transient Division, 542 F. Supp. at 960.
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ployee benefits to local or international supplements, the contracts did
cover the statutory purposes.9 6 The district court noted little resistance
to the issue of whether NTD was an LMRDA labor organization. In-
stead, arguments centered on whether NTD was a local or a national
labor organization - an issue of first impression.
E. Local Versus National Labor Organization
The district court found that NTD was a national labor organization
because the typical local organization is based on geographic bounda-
ries. 9 7 The Tenth Circuit reversed, holding that NTD is a local organi-
zation because of its functional and structural characteristics. 98 The
lower court was correct when it stated that typically local unions follow
geographic boundaries. 99 However, NTD is in essence a nationwide lo-
cal, serving those employees that are unable to maintain an active mem-
bership in fixed-location locals. A local union has primary responsibility
for labor relations with employers, including contract negotiation, con-
tract administration, and grievance handling.' 0 0 In addition to contract
negotiation, NTD representatives engage in grievance handling and
dues collection.' 0 ' In order to effectuate the purposes of the Act,
10 2
and maximize rank-and-file control and participation in union manage-
ment, NTD must be a local labor organization within the meaning of the
Act.
III. DISABILITY BENEFITS DURING A STRIKE: CoNoco, INC. v. NLRB
A. Background
Conoco, Inc. v. NLRB 103 involved the denial of disability benefits to
an employee while the company was being struck by the union repre-
senting its employees. Ms. Fransen, a Conoco employee and union
member, became temporarily unable to work due to medical reasons on
January 3, 1980. She began receiving disability benefits pursuant to the
Comprehensive Disability Income Plan included in the collective bar-
gaining agreement between Conoco and the union. On January 8, 1980,
the union instituted a lawful economic strike. On the first day of the
strike, Ms. Fransen's disability benefits were terminated. The Disability
96. 736 F.2d at 622.
97. 542 F. Supp. at 960.
98. 736 F.2d at 622-23.
99. The "reasonably typical" union structure consists of locals representing employ-
ees of a plant or an employer in "a defined geographic area," that are affiliated with the
international or national. D. BOK &J. DUNLOP, LABOR IN THE AMERICAN COMMUNITY 150-
51 (1970). The "structure of the typical American labor union" involves a national or
international, which charters local unions. The locals'jurisdiction is defined on plant, em-
ployer, or geographic basis. W. OBERER, K. HANSLOWE & J. ANDERSEN, LABOR LAw 180
(1979).
100. A. SLOANE & F. WHITNEY, LABOR RELATIONS 166-67 (1972).
101. National Transient Division, 736 F.2d at 618.
102. The purposes of the Act are to safeguard members' rights and ensure internal
union democracy. Note, supra note 75, at 157-58.
103. 740 F.2d 811 (10th Cir. 1984).
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Income Plan included a clause denying benefits during the period an
employee is on strike or lay-off.10 4 More than a month after termination
of the benefits, Ms. Fransen began to picket for the union. She was
medically certified as able to return to work on March 25, 1980. The
strike ended on April 1, 1980. The NLRB then filed a charge alleging
that termination of Ms. Fransen's benefits was an unfair labor practice,
in violation of sections 8(a)(1) and 8(a)(3) of the Taft-Hartley Act. 10 5
The administrative law judge (ALJ) awarded Ms. Fransen disability
benefits from the date the strike began until the time she publicly partic-
ipated in strike activities. The ALJ's decision relied upon the prior Na-
tional Labor Relations Board decision of Emerson Electric Co. 10 6 which
denied benefits to disabled employees who participated in and publicly
supported the strike. The ALJ accepted Ms. Fransen's prima facie case
of discriminatory treatment, and rejected Conoco's defense that Ms.
Fransen was properly denied benefits under the Plan. Although the ALJ
found the clause to be legal, he decided that the clause was ambiguous,
and did not apply to disabled employees who were not actively on strike.
The Board agreed that an unfair labor practice had been commit-
ted, and ordered Conoco to pay the disability benefits for the entire pe-
riod of the disability. This was consistent with the Third Circuit's
modification of the Emerson decision in E.L. Weigand Division v. NLRB,1
0 7
and with the Board's reversal of its previous position. 10 8 In Weigand, the
Third Circuit ruled that an employer committed an unfair labor practice
in terminating disability benefits during a strike, and declined to allow
the employer to discontinue benefits if the disabled employee partici-
pated in the strike prior to being medically certified to return to
work. 1 9 Agreeing that the disability benefits were accrued and based
on work already performed, the Third Circuit stated that such benefits
could not be denied by the employer during a strike under the guise of
not being required to finance a strike against itself. 10 The court found
that the employer had exhibited an anti-union motivation, III and ac-
104. Id. at 812. The Plan's clause stated: "If benefits are being paid prior to a strike or
layoff, such benefits will cease for the duration of such strike or layoff. No benefits will be
paid during the time you are on strike or layoff." Id.
105. 29 U.S.C. §§ 158(a)(1), (a)(3) (1982). Section 8(a) provides:
It shall be an unfair labor practice for an employer -
(1) to interfere with, restrain, or coerce employees in the exercise of the rights
guaranteed in section 7 ....
(3) by discrimination in regard to hire or tenure of employment or any term or
condition of employment to encourage or discourage membership in any labor
organization ....
106. 246 N.L.R.B. 1143 (1979), modified, 650 F.2d 463 (3d Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 455
U.S. 939 (1982).
107. 650 F.2d 463 (3d Cir. 1981).
108. See Southwestern Electric Power Co., 216 N.L.R.B. 522 (1975).
109. Weigand, 650 F.2d at 463. Howe 4 r, "[a]ctive participation in strike activity may
be telling, or even presumptive, evidence of cessation of disability." Id. at 473-74.
110. An employer need not pay wages to employees while the employer is being struck.
See Ace Tank and Heater Co., 167 N.L.R.B. 663, 665 (1967); General Elec. Co., 80
N.L.R.B. 510, 511 (1948).
111. 650 F.2d at 470. The Board may infer the existence of discrimination, based on
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cepted the Board's position that the denial of benefits was "inherently
destructive" of the employees' section 7 rights.' 12
B. The Tenth Circuit Decision
The Tenth Circuit, following the Weigand analysis, agreed that Co-
noco was guilty of anti-union activities in denying disability benefits to
Ms. Fransen, and therefore upheld and enforced the Board's deci-
sion. 13 The Tenth Circuit's decision affirmed an employee's right to
accrued benefits which have previously been earned, and held that de-
nial of such benefits during a strike is "inherently destructive of the em-
ployee's section 7 rights."' 14
Since 1967,15 the denial of vacation benefits during a lawful strike
has been held to be an unfair labor practice, either because the benefits
were previously earned, or because the employer had an improper mo-
tive.'1 6 The same has been true of insurance premiums1 1 7 and sever-
its accumulated experience and factual enquiries. NLRB v. Erie Resistor Corp., 373 U.S.
221, 227-32 (1963).
In NLRB v. Great Dane Trailers, Inc., 388 U.S. 26 (1967), the Board found an unfair
labor practice (discrimination and discouragement of union membership) when an em-
ployer refused to pay strikers accrued vacation benefits due under the expired labor con-
tract, and announced that it intended to pay such benefits to strike replacements as well as
non-striking or returning employees. The Supreme Court announced a test of unlawful
anti-union motivation to be inferred from an employer's conduct. Conduct that is " 'in-
herently destructive of employee interests' " needs no proof of motive (quoting NLRB v.
Brown, 380 U.S. 278, 287 (1965)), and an unfair labor practice may be found even if the
employer justifies or explains his actions. The conduct "carries with it 'unavoidable conse-
quences which the employer not only foresaw but which he must have intended' " and thus
bears " 'its own indicia of intent' " (quoting NLRB v. Erie Resistor Corp., 373 U.S. at 228,
231). However, when " 'the resulting harm to employee rights is .. .comparatively
slight, and a substantial and legitimate business end is served,' " the employer's conduct
must be proven to be improperly motivated (quoting NLRB v. Brown, 380 U.S. at 289). In
Great Dane, the employer's conduct was said to be "inherently destructive" of employee
rights.
112. The court did not describe the employer's actions as "inherently destructive" or
"comparatively slight," but did not consider the employer's business justification an ac-
ceptable rebuttal. 650 F.2d at 467-71. See supra note 53 for the text of section 7 of the
LMRA.
113. 740 F.2d at 815-16. The Tenth Circuit applied the Great Dane two-prong test for
the inference of anti-union animus. See supra note 111.
114. 740 F.2d at 813. See supra note I11.
115. NLRB v. Great Dane Trailers, Inc., 388 U.S. 26 (1967).
116. See, e.g., Allied Indus. Workers, Local 287 v. NLRB, 476 F.2d 868, 871-72, 876
(D.C. Cir. 1973) (company announcement that no vacation benefits could be scheduled or
paid during a strike); NLRB v. Jemco, Inc., 465 F.2d 1148, 1150-52 (6th Cir. 1972) (com-
pany denied vacation pay to all workers after collective bargaining agreement expired, but
"unequal treatment of different classes of employees is [not] a prerequisite" for a section
8(a)(3) violation where concerted activity is involved), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1109 (1973);
Local 186, United Packinghouse Food and Allied Workers v. Armour & Co., 446 F.2d 610,
611, 615 (6th Cir. 1971) (company refused to pay vacation benefits earned in prior year
when plant closed), cert. denied, 405 U.S. 955 (1972); NLRB v. Frick Co., 397 F.2d 956, 959-
61 (3d Cir. 1968) (company removed strikers' names from payroll, making them ineligible
for vacation benefits); Indiana & Mich. Elec. Co., 236 N.L.R.B. 986 (1978) (the company
threatened not to pay previously earned accumulated leave unless employees abandoned
the strike), enforced, 89 Lab. Cas. (CCH) 12,157 (1979).
117. Viggiano v. Anchor Hocking Corp., 574 F. Supp. 861, 863-64 (W.D. Pa. 1983)
(threat to terminate insurance payments after collective bargaining agreement expired if
employees went on strike, in spite of clause continuing benefits after contract ended), va-
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ance pay.' I8 However, other courts have not consistently followed the
lead of the Board or the Supreme Court, finding that under the particu-
lar language of the collective bargaining agreement benefits were not
accrued, or by failing to find an improper motivation by the employer in
refusing to pay the benefits during a strike.' 19 One circuit could not
decide whether disability benefits were wages or accrued benefits. 1
20
In its Conoco decision, the Tenth Circuit has stated that disability
benefits are earned prior to the disability and therefore are accrued ben-
efits. Further, an employer that discontinues disability benefits because
of a strike will be assumed to be acting out of anti-union animus and be
guilty of an unfair labor practice, despite an explicit collective bargain-
ing agreement or Plan language denying benefits in the event of a strike.
The message is clear, and consistent with the holdings of the Board and
Third Circuit.
Lisolette Alitz
cated on other gsounds, 750 F.2d 276 (3d Cir. 1984); Ace Tank and Heater Co., 167 N.L.R.B.
663 (1967) (refusal to pay insurance premiums for strikers); Cone Bros. Contracting Co.,
158 N.L.R.B. 186, 188 (1966) (" lilt is true that strikers may incur certain economic losses,
such as wages whose sole aspect is monetary compensation for work performed during the
employment relationship. But strike activity does not entail acceptance after the strike of a
small quantum of vested job rights and privileges.").
118. NLRB v. Darling & Co.. 420 F.2d 63 (7th Cir. 1970).
119. See, e.g., District 29, United Mine Workers v. Royal Coal Co., 768 F,2d 588 (4th
Cir. 1985) (denial of health benefits and life insurance coverage to retired and disabled
employees after expiration of labor contract permitted, based on the intent of the parties
that such benefits only be provided during the term of the agreement); NLRB v. Sherwin-
Williams Co., 714 F.2d 1095 (11th Cir. 1983) (withholding disability benefits during a
strike allowed because Plan language granted benefits only to the extent that employees
could reasonably have expected to work, and it was past practice to deny such benefits
during a strike); Vesuvius Crucible Co. v. NLRB, 668 F.2d 162 (3d Cir. 1981) (company
refused to pay strikers their vacation benefits earned while working without a contract
because the company believed that without a new agreement it had no wav to compute the
benefits due); Local 358. Bakery and Confectionary Workers Union v. Nolde Bros., Inc.,
382 F. Supp. 1354 (E.D. Va. 1974) (denial of severance pay to strikers because they
breached the contract in order to avoid its no-strike clause, and finding that severance pay
is not a vested right), revdon other grounds, 530 F.2d 548 (4th Cir. 1975), afd, 430 U.S. 243
(1977) (deciding the case based on federal labor policy regarding arbitration, not accrual
of benefits).
120. Texaco, Inc. v. NLRB. 700 F.2d 1031. 1040-42, 1042 n.2 (5th Cir. 1983). In a
case involving the denial for disability benefits, which were tied to employee seniority, for
workers who were ill during a strike, the Fifth Circuit stated that the disability benefits
resembled both accrued benefits and wages but supported the Board's finding that they
were accrued benefits. None of the employees participated in the strike during the periods
of disability and the court expressed "no opinion . . . on the availability of Idisabilityl
benefits once a still-disabled employee expresses support for a strike."
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IV. THE EMPLOYMENT-AT-WILL DOCTRINE
Two Tenth Circuit cases during the survey period dealt with the
"at-will" doctrine in employment law. In accordance with Erie v.
Tompkins, 12 1 the court applied the relevant state law in each of these di-
versity actions.
A. Background
A general hiring for an indefinite period has been deemed in com-
mon law to create an at-will employment relationship in which an em-
ployer can discharge an employee for good reason, bad reason or no
reason at all. ' 2 2 The employment-at-will doctrine applies to those work-
ers not covered by a collective bargaining agreement' 23 and not em-
ployed by the government.1
2 4
Employment-at-will has not always been the general rule. The Eng-
lish common law, as interpreted by Blackstone, contained a presumption
that "[i]f the hiring be general without any particular time limited, the
law construes it to be a hiring for a year."' 2 5 This presumption was
based on the status of the employment relationship and not a contract
between employer and employee.12 6 Under this status relationship the
master was responsible for the general welfare of the servant. 12 7
The American courts adopted and maintained this presumption of a
one-year term of employment until the late nineteenth century.' 28 At
that time, American courts shifted the emphasis to the choice inherent
in freedom of contracts, 129 and the employment-at-will doctrine was
born. 130 Under this doctrine, the terms of the employment contract
were to be voluntarily agreed upon and not presumed.'13 Thus, if em-
ployer and employee did not agree upon a set term of employment, the
employee could be fired at any time.
121. 304 U.S. 64 (1938).
122. See Spivey v. Watkins Motor Lines, Inc., 115 L.L.R.M. (BNA) 3407 (S.D. Ga.
1984); Black v. Standard Oil Co., 115 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 3076 (N.D. Ohio 1983); Maguire v.
American Family Life Ass. Co., 442 So. 2d 321 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1983).
123. See Pleck, Unjust Discharge From Employment: A Necessary Change in the Law, 40 OHIO
ST. L.J. 1, 8 (1979) (approximately 95 percent of collective bargaining agreements contain
grievance and arbitration provisions, and approximately 80 percent of the agreements re-
quire just cause for discharge).
124. See Stieber & Murray, Protection Against Unjust Discharge: The Need for a Federal Stat-
ute, 16 U. MICH. JL REv. 319, 320-21 (1983) (government employees are either covered
by public sector collective bargaining or have access to civil service procedures).
125. W. BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND 413 (1979 facsimile of
the 1st ed.)
126. SELZNICK, LAW, SOCIETY AND INDUSTRIAL JUSTICE 123 (1969) (An agreement might
establish certain terms but "custom and public policy, not the will of the parties, defined
the implicit framework of mutual rights or obligations.").
127. Id. at 128.
128. Summers, The Contract of Employment and the Rights of Individual Employees: Fair Rep-
resentation and Employment at Will, 52 FORDHAM L. REV. 1082, 1084 (1982).
129. SELZNICK, supra note 126, at 131.
130. H. G. WOOD, MASTER AND SERVANT § 134 (1877) (the first treatise writer to chal-
lenge the presumption of hiring for a term and proclaim the at-will rule).
131. SELZNICK, supra note 126, at 131.
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The pendulum is now beginning to swing back toward a presump-
tion of hiring for a term and away from employment-at-will. Within the
last two decades the common law notion of employment-at-will has been
judicially eroded by wrongful discharge exceptions which include breach
of implied employment contract, commission of a tort, and discharge in
violation of public policy.' 3 2 These exceptions have created ajust cause
requirement for the termination of an employee, giving the employee
the job security he once had under the presumption of hiring for a term.
To bring order to the state courts' varied approaches to the re-
emerging employment-at-will issue, commentators have advocated the
introduction of a uniform statute 133 or the use of an arbitration clause in
the employment contract covering wrongful discharge claims. 134 Until
uniform standards are established, federal courts will be forced to inter-
pret state common law in this area, since many of these cases will be
diversity actions tried in federal courts. The federal courts' interpreta-
tion of state law will necessarily be subjective and thus the federal courts
ruling may either expand, limit, or maintain the status quo of the state
common law.' 3 5 Attorneys should be aware of how a federal court in-
terprets state law in order to make better strategic choices as to where to
bring suit and what to arguc.
B. Garcia v. Aetna Finance Company
1. Facts
In Garcia v. Aetna Finance Company, 1 3 6 the plaintiff, Garcia, had been
employed from 1956 to 1975 by GAC Finance. 13 7 In 1975, the defend-
ant acquired the branch offices of GAC and assigned Garcia to those
offices in a position that was substantially similar to his previous position
with GAC. Shortly thereafter, the defendant disseminated an employ-
ment policy manual which implemented new policies and procedures,
including a procedure for termination. 13 8 Garcia was terminated on
September 21, 1979, after performance appraisals revealed certain defi-
ciencies in the management of his area of responsibility.
2. The Tenth Circuit Opinion
On appeal, Garcia argued that the employment relationship be-
132. Tobias, "Can You Help Ale? I've Been Fired," 70 A.B.A.J. April, 1984, at 68.
133. See Stieber & Murray, supra note 124; Summers, Individual Protection Against Lnjust
Dismissal.- Time for a Statute, 62 VA. L. REV. 48" (1976); cf. Steiber, Protection Against Unfair
Dismissal, A Comparative View, 169 ScH. LAB. INDUS. REL. RESEARCh REPRINT SERIES 231-32
(Mich. St. Univ. 1979-1980) (The following European countries have a statute requiring
just cause for discharge: Denmark, Sweden, West Germany, Great Britian, Norway,
France, Italy and Ireland.).
134. Blumrosen, Exploring 'oluntary Arbitration of Individual Employment Disputes, 16 Micn.
J.L. REF. 249 (1983).
135. See Comment, The Role of Federal Courts in Changing State Law: The Employment At Will
Doctrine in Pennsylvania, 137 U. PA. L. REV. 277 (1984).
136. 752 F.2d 488 (10th Cir. 1984).
137. Id. at 489.
138. Garcia, 752 F.2d at 490 (10th Cir. 1984) (citing Brief for Appellant at 4-5).
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tween Aetna and himself was for a definite term.13 9 Garcia based this
argument on Aetna's employment policy manual, which required annual
appraisals, and the fact that Aetna's rehiring was based on a yearly
salary. '
40
The Tenth Circuit affirmed the lower court's grant of summary
judgment for Aetna. It agreed that the policy manual did not constitute
an employment contract for a definite term. 14 Because the plaintiff had
not negotiated the content of the policy manual, the policy manual was
only a unilateral expression of policy by Aetna. 14 2 Furthermore, the
court found that the evidence did not "establish that both parties under-
stood that an employment contract existed between plaintiff and defend-
ant that was for a definite term."' 143 The court also found that rehiring
based on an annual salary did not imply a fixed term of employment.144
The Tenth Circuit found that Colorado had decided this precise issue in
Justice v. Stanley Aviation Corporation.14 5 Because there was no fixed
term of employment, the court found that either party could terminate
their employment relationship at any time without incurring liability.' 4 6
Garcia's second argument was based on the modern view that em-
ployment contracts for an indefinite period of time are not terminable at
will by the employer. 147 The Tenth Circuit equated this implied duty of
fair dealing 14 8 with the broad and general statutory statements of public
policy which the Colorado courts had found inadequate to justify an ex-
ception to the at-will rule in Lampe v. Presbyterian Medical Center 149 and
Corbin v. Sinclair Marketing, Inc. 150 Accordingly, the Tenth Circuit found
no public-policy exception to the at-will rule. t 5 1
3. Alternative Strategies in the Colorado At-Will Arena
In Corbin, the Colorado Court of Appeals acknowledged that other
courts have held that an employee manual can provide a good-cause ex-
ception to the at-will doctrine, but distinguished those cases from the
facts before it since a safety manual, not an employee manual, was at
issue. 15 2 In Salimi v. Farmers Insurance Group,lSS however, the Colorado
139. 752 F.2d at 490. If an employment contract is for a definite term, just cause is
usually required to terminate an employee before the term has expired. See, e.g., Alpern v.
Hurwitz, 644 F.2d 943 (2d Cir. 1981); Chapin v. Klein, 128 Ariz. 94, 623 P.2d 1250 (Ariz.
Ct. App. 1981); Rosecrans v. Intermountain Soap & Chem. Co., 100 Idaho 785, 605 P.2d
963 (1980).
140. 752 F.2d at 490.
141. FOOTNOTE ADDED TO BALANCE WITH TEXT.
142. Id. at 490-91.
143. Id. at 490.
144. Id.
145. 35 Colo. App. 1, 530 P.2d 984 (1974).
146. Garcia, 752 F.2d at 491.
147. Id. (citing Monge v. Beebe Rubber Co., 114 N.H. 130, 316 A.2d 549 (1974)).
148. See Monge v. Beebe Rubber Co., 114 N.H. 130, 316 A.2d 549 (1974).
149. 42 Colo. App. 465, 590 P.2d 513 (1979).
150. 684 P.2d 265 (Colo. Ct. App. 1984).
151. Garcia, 752 F.2d at 491.
152. Corbin, 684 P.2d at 267.
153. 684 P.2d 264 (Colo. Ct. App. 1984).
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Court of Appeals found that such a claim would survive a motion to
dismiss. The plaintiff in Corbin, like the plaintiff in Garcia, never alleged
the good-cause exception. Plaintiffs would be well advised to cover all
bases by alleging such a claim in federal court since Colorado has left
this door open.
One other avenue may be available to plaintiffs, depending on the
specific facts of their claims. In Lampe, the Colorado Court of Appeals
stated in dicta that a public policy exception to the at-will doctrine could
be found if an employee is discharged for exercising a specifically en-
acted right or duty; such as the right to file for workmen's compensation
or the duty to serve on a jury. 1 54 The public policy exception should
not be alleged in all cases, however. In Corbin, the Colorado Court of
Appeals ruled that the public-policy exception "is not available when
• . .the statute at issue provides to the employee a wrongful discharge
remedy." 155 It is recommended that future plaintiffs in Colorado deter-
mine if there is a statutory remedy which may preclude the public policy
at-will exception.
C. Ellis v. El Paso Natural Gas Company
1. Facts
In Ellis v. El Paso Natural Gas Company, 15 6 the Tenth Circuit applied
New Mexico law to the at-will employment issue. The plaintiff, Ellis, had
been employed by the defendant for almost thirty years.15 7 Following a
dispute with his supervisor, Ellis used the problem solving procedures
set out in the defendant's personnel manual to appeal the supervisor's
decisions. El Paso retaliated against Ellis by denying him promotions
and pay increases, demoting him, and allegedly forcing his constructive
discharge. 1
58
2. The Tenth Circuit Opinion
On appeal, Ellis made two claims: (1) a claim in tort for retaliatory
discharge; and (2) a claim of breach of implied contract based on the
defendant's personnel manual.' 5 9 The trial court had ruled that the
claim for retaliatory discharge was barred by the New Mexico Court of
Appeals ruling in Bottiliso v. Hutchison Fruit Company. 160 The Tenth Cir-
cuit noted that Vigil v. Arzola,'"6 a New Mexico Court of Appeals deci-
sion handed down after the trial court's decision, had held that a cause
of action for retaliatory discharge exists "when the discharge of an em-
154. Lampe v. Presbyterian Medical Center, 41 Colo App. 465, 590 P.2d 513, 515
(1978).
155. 684 P.2d at 267.
156. 754 F.2d 884 (10th Cir. 1985).
157. Id. at 885.
158. Id.
159. Id.
160. 96 N.M. 789, 635 P.2d 992 (N.M. Ct. App. 1981).
161. Vigil v. Arzola, No. 5921 (N.M. Ct. App.) (cited in Ellis, 754 F.2d at 885).
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ployee contravenes some clear mandate of public policy."1 6 2
In Ellis, Ellis admitted that his discharge did not involve public pol-
icy considerations, but argued that New Mexico courts would recognize
the tort of retaliatory discharge in a situation involving a non-public pol-
icy discharge if presented with the facts of his case. 163 The court dis-
agreed, stating that Vigil had thoroughly reviewed the existing authority
and legal commentary and had limited its holding to cases involving dis-
charges which contravene public policy.164 Therefore, the Tenth Cir-
cuit refused to expand the ruling of Vigil to include Ellis' retaliatory
discharge claim. 1
65
Regarding the breach of implied contract claim, Ellis argued that
the defendant assured him that it would continue to supply him with
wage increases and promotions if he performed his work satisfacto-
rily. 166 He relied on the personnel manual to support this argument.
The personnel manual stated that the company "will sever the employ-
ment relationship in a fair and consistent manner" and "will establish a
fair and consistent method" to resolve employee disputes. '
67
The Tenth Circuit noted that New Mexico does recognize implied
employment contracts, 168 but agreed with the trial court's finding that
the provisions of the personnel manual "are too indefinite to constitute
a contract. . . . The language is of a non-promissory nature and merely
a declaration of defendant's general approach to the subject matter dis-
cussed." 16 9 Thus, the court did not find an implied contract requiring
just cause for termination.
3. Alternative Strategies in the New Mexico At-Will Arena
As in Garcia,170 the Tenth Circuit took a conservative approach in
Ellis in refusing to expand New Mexico's public policy exception to the
at-will rule. Future plaintiffs arguing before the federal courts would be
well advised to couch retaliation claims in public policy language. In
Ellis, the plaintiff could have argued that he was exercising a right under
the personnel manual, and that firing an employee for doing so leads to
animosity between employer and employees, and results in lower eco-
nomic production.
For implied contract claims, it is recommended that future plaintiffs
develop a full evidentiary record of specific intent manifested by the em-
162. 754 F.2d at 885 (quoting from Brief for Appellee at 33).
163. Id. at 885-86.
164. Id. (citing Vigil (from Brief for Appellee at 28): "We do not abrogate the at will
rule; we only limit its application to those situations where the employee's discharge re-
sults from the employer's violation of a clear public policy.").
165. 754 F.2d at 886.
166. Id.
167. Id.
168. Id. (citing Forrester v. Parker, 93 N.M 781, 606 P.2d 191 (1980) and Hernandez v.
Home Educ. Livelihood Program, Inc., 98 N.M. 125, 645 P.2d 1381 (N.M. Ct. App.), cert.
denied, 98 N.M. 336, 648 P.2d 794 (N.M. 1982)).
169. 754 F.2d at 886 (quoting the trial court).
170. 752 F.2d 488 (10th Cir. 1984); See supra notes 136-151 and accompanying text.
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ployer, in addition to introduction of the personnel manual. As a ques-
tion of fact, plaintiffs will find it difficult to win such a claim on appeal in
federal court unless the trial court's interpretation of facts is clearly
erroneous. 171
Stewart Beyerle
171. See FED. R. Civ. P. 52(a).
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